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Abstract
We present the operational semantics of Carmel, a language that models the Java Card Virtual
Machine Language. We define a small-step relation between program configurations, including rules
for exception handling, array objects and subroutines. We also include the basic structures needed to
model object ownership and the Java Card firewall.
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1. Introduction
Java Card was first introduced in 1996 as a new technology that enables Java applets
to be loaded and executed in new generation smart cards and other devices with limited
memory. Java Card is a simplified version of Java e.g. it does not include threads, floating
point numbers and multi-dimensional arrays, and has a relatively small size API. Java Card
applications are also small due to the memory limitations of the Smart Card processor. All
these factors combined with the security-critical nature of its applications have made it an
ideal case-study for the application of formal methods.
The Java Card platform [8] is defined by three (natural language) specifications: the Java
Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) Specification [29], the Java Card Application Programming
Interface (API) [27], and the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification [28].
The specifications of other important components of the Java Card system—such as the
bytecode verifier, applet installer and CAP converter—can either be found scattered in
the specification of the main components or deduced from their counterparts in the Java
system (e.g. bytecode verification [18]). Unfortunately, the official Java Card specifications
are sometimes ambiguous, contradictory and lack mathematical rigour.
The main goal of this work is to present a readable and complete specification of the
JCVM that can be used as a component of the specification of the whole Java Card system
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which takes into account the JCRE and API. We define the operational semantics of Carmel
[20], a language that models the Java Card Virtual Machine Language. We define a small-
step relation between program configurations—including rules for exception handling and
subroutines—in a style similar to the one used by Bertelsen [6] and use a type system based
on the work of Freund and Mitchell [11].
The distinctive features of this article that are due to the fact that we deal with Java
Card, and not Java, can be summarised as follows:
• The JCVM provides an object access mechanism, the JC firewall, based on object own-
ership. We define the basic structures needed to model object ownership and the Java
Card firewall, and improve on the work of Éluard et al. [10] by providing a complete
specification of the firewall which accounts for transient data.
• A Java Card is governed by the JCRE. Most of the interaction between a running applet
and the JCRE is done via the invocation of API methods. A complete specification of
the semantics of the JCRE and API belongs to another document [25]. In this paper
we provide a framework for such specification by modelling the JCRE as part of the
machine state and defining the basic interactions between the JCVM and the JCRE.
Several formal specifications of the JCVM have been developed in recent years [15].
Research in the program verification area have produced reasonably complete specifica-
tions [5] developed with the aid of automated proof assistants [9,22]. These specifications,
though complete, are large and difficult to read. Other specifications focus in a reduced
subset or a particular aspect of the machine e.g. firewall [10]. Furthermore, these specifica-
tions do not take into account the other components of the Java Card system i.e. JCRE and
API. The main contribution of this article in relation to existing semantic descriptions of
the JCVM is that it presents in a formal and clear way—avoiding notation specific to, for
example, proof assistants—the most distinctive features of the JCVM and its instruction set
and, as pointed out above, it models the basic interactions between the JVML and JCRE.
In particular, special detail have been given to the specification of the firewall.
We start by presenting the syntax of Carmel and the basic program structures used
in this paper (Section 2). We then define the runtime structures and values used by the
JCVM (Section 3) and formalise the mechanism for throwing exceptions (Section 4) and
the firewall rules (Section 5). Next, we explain in detail the configurations and rules that
define the operational semantics of Carmel (Section 6) and finish by summarising related
work (Section 7) and presenting conclusions and future work (Section 8).
1.1. Notation
A Domain is defined as a set equipped with functions. For convenience, in some cases
we define new domains as records. A record defined by
Dom = (f1 : Dom1) × . . . × (fn : Domn)
is equivalent to the domain Dom equipped with the interface fi ∈ Dom → Domi , for 0 <
i  n. Given e ∈ Dom, access to element fi is written as e.fi and element update is
performed by e[fi → v], where v ∈ Domi . To simplify notation, we will usually write
o.f (args) instead of f (o, args).
We write [X] to denote the set of finite arrays of elements of domain X. The length of an
array can be known using the function length : [X] → int. The indices of an array x range
from 0 to x.length − 1. Elements of the array x can be accessed using the standard x[i]
notation. The i-th element of an array is updated by x[i → v]. We use X∗ to denote the set
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of sequences of elements of domain X, defined by X∗ ::= |xX∗, where x ∈ X and  is
the empty sequence.
2. Carmel syntax
The Java Card technology is a subset of the Java platform. Features such as characters and
strings, threads, cloning, garbage collection, the security manager and dynamic class load-
ing are not supported. Only basic object-oriented capabilities and features that are well-suited
for writing programs for smart cards are supported. The JCVML is an optimised subset of the
Java bytecode instruction set which, besides not including the instructions related to the un-
supported Java features, does not support large primitive data types (long, float and float)
and multi-dimensional arrays. Java Card programs, unlike Java, are not represented as
class files. Instead, the compiled class files of a package are converted to a Java Card CAP
(converted applet) file which is then ready to be installed on a card. The CAP file format is
optimised for a small footprint by using compact data structures and limited indirection e.g.
names are dropped, and tokens and offsets are used instead.
Carmel is a language that models the JCVML. It captures all the JCVML features while
reducing the number of instructions (by grouping similar JCVML instructions into a single
Carmel instruction) and abstracting away certain complexities of the CAP file format such
as the use of tokens, offsets and the constant pool. The syntax of a Carmel program is shown
in Figs. 1 and 2. We have only included the elements of the program structure that are rele-
vant for the presentation of this paper. The rest of the syntax e.g. parts needed for bytecode
verification, can be found in [20]. A Carmel program is made of a set of packages—the
packages that have been loaded to the card. A package contains classes and interfaces, and
is uniquely identified by an AID (application identifier). A method structure m contains
information about the method’s ID—used for virtual method invocation (Section 6.3.3)—
its type and the class or interface (m.classI) where it was declared. We write |m| to denote
the method’s arity. A non-abstract method has additional information concerning its body.
The sequence of instructions that make up a method’s body is accessed via elements of the
domain Address. We use m.instructionAt(addr) to access the instruction at address addr
in method m. The first instruction of a method is located at address 0 and the instruction
following the instruction at address addr can be found at addr + 1. A field is uniquely iden-
tified by a field ID. A field structure f contains information about the field’s type and ID.
Classes and interfaces hold information about direct fields and methods, inherited
elements have to be looked up in the superclass. A set of auxiliary functions is defined
to help extract information from the class hierarchy. The functions superClasses(cl) and
superInterfaces∗(iface) return the set of all the superclasses and superinterfaces of class cl
and interface iface, respectively. The function implements∗(cl) returns the set of interfaces
implemented by cl while instanceFields(cl) returns the set of non-static fields (direct and
inherited) of class cl.
The Carmel instruction set is divided into six groups, each dealing with a different as-
pect of the language: imperative core (C), objects (O), method invocation (M), arrays (A),
exceptions (E) and subroutines (S). The instruction set1 is defined in Fig. 2. As JCVM in-
structions, most Carmel instructions are typed and operate on values that have an expected
1 For this presentation, we have removed the keyswitch, indexswitch instructions, and those that take the
this keyword as argument.
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Fig. 1. Carmel syntax.
runtime type—the operand type. One of the main differences between the JCVM language
and Carmel resides in the way the operand type information is encoded. In Carmel, instead
of having a specialised instruction for each operand type (e.g. astore, istore), instruc-
tions take the operand type as an argument (e.g. store r 2). This simplification reduces
the number of instructions. Constants c are introduced by the push instruction and can be
either integers or the special constant null. Number of words are denoted by n and d , local
variable indices by i, while addr is used to denote an instruction address.
All references to classes, interfaces, methods and fields have been resolved to their
respective representation structure and can be accessed directly from wherever they are
referenced. Thus, the field structure f can be extracted directly from the getstatic f in-
struction. However, in order to make the presentation more readable, names—concrete syn-
tax—are introduced when necessary. Thus, when we write Object we are actually referring
to the structure associated to the java.lang.Object2 class in the program.
2 By default we will assume that classes without prefix belong to the java.lang package.
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Fig. 2. Carmel instruction set.
3. Runtime structures and values
3.1. Objects and the heap
Objects are stored in the heap. The heap is defined as a mapping from locations to
objects, which can be class instances or array objects. Java Card objects are defined in Fig.
3. A class instance 〈τ, fv, own, ep〉c contains information about the object’s class (τ ), its
instance fields runtime values (fv), owner (own) and JCRE entry point type (ep). An array
object 〈τ, n, vs, own, g, t〉a contains the type of its elements (τ ) and information about the
array’s size (n), values (vs), owner (own), global access (g) and memory persistency (tr).
Object ownership, JCRE entry points, and global and transient (i.e. not persistent) arrays
are special features of Java Card. The domains associated with these features are:
own ∈ Owner = (context : Context) × (aid : AID ∪ {JCRE})
ctxt ∈ Context = AID ∪ {JCRE} ep ∈ EntryPoint = {perm, temp, no}
tr ∈ Transient = {CLEAR_ON_RESET, CLEAR_ON_DESELECT, NOT_TRANSIENT}
An object’s Owner is made of two components: the AID of the owning applet and the
AID of the package where the owning applet is defined, called the object’s (group) Context.
In general, the Java Card firewall only allows access among objects that belong to the
same context. Special JCRE-owned objects i.e. JCRE entry points and global arrays, can
be accessed from any context. Object ownership and access checks are discussed in detail
in the section dedicated to the Firewall (Section 5).
For security reasons, sometimes it is not desirable to preserve data stored in objects
across sessions. An object is transient if the data stored in its fields is cleared whenever
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Fig. 3. Java Card objects and the heap.
the card is reset or the applet is deselected. In the current specification of the JCVM
[29] only arrays with primitive components or references to Object can be designated
as transient objects. There are two types of transient objects, namely, CLEAR_ON_RESET
and CLEAR_ON_DESELECT. The interaction between transient objects and the applet firewall
is explained in Section 5.
New objects are created and allocated by the JCVM according to the newObject and
newArray relations. A new object 〈τ, fv, own, ep〉c—or a new array 〈τ, n, vs, own, g, tr〉a—
is correctly allocated in heap H—generating new heap H ′—and assigned location loc if
the following conditions are satisfied:
〈H ′, loc〉 ∈ newObject(own, τ, ep,H) ⇔
loc /∈ dom(H) ∧ H ′ = H [loc → o] ∧ o = 〈τ, fv, own, ep〉c ∧
fv = {(f.id, def(f.type)) | f ∈ instanceFields(τ )}
(1)
〈H ′, loc〉 ∈ newArray(own, τ, n, g, tr,H) ⇔
loc /∈ dom(H) ∧ H ′ = H [loc → a] ∧ a = 〈τ, n, vs, own, g, tr〉a ∧
vs.length = n ∧ ∀i.0  i < n. vs[i] = def(τ )
(2)
where instanceFields is the set of non-static fields of a class, including the fields defined in
its superclasses, and def(τ ) returns the default value for a particular type τ (0 for numeric
types and null for reference types). For this presentation we assume that fields and array
values are initialised to the default values indicated by their types.
Note that newObject and newArray are non-deterministic. No constraints are placed on
loc being unique, we only make sure that loc is a fresh location i.e. loc /∈ dom(H).
3.1.1. Heap update
Class instances and array objects are identified by their location in the heap. Similarly
an element location, defined by
eloc ∈ ElementLocation = (Location × FieldID) + (Location × ShortValue),
is used to identify instance fields and array entries of class instances and array objects,
respectively. Thus, we define a more succinct definition of field and array update with the
updateEle function:
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updateEle : Heap × ElementLocation × Value → Heap
updateEle(H, (loc, id), v) = H [loc → o′],
o′ = H(loc)[fieldValues → H(loc).fieldValues[id → v]]
updateEle(H, (loc, i), v) = H [loc → a′],
a′ = H(loc)[values → H(loc).values[i → v]]
(3)
3.2. Values and runtime data types
The JCVM supports two kind of values: primitive values and reference values. Primitive
values consist on numeric values (byte, short and int) and return addresses. Reference
values consist on references to class instances and one-dimensional array objects (loca-
tions, Section 3.1) and the special constant null. Java Card virtual machine values can
be:
v ∈ Value = PrimitiveValue ∪ ReferenceValue
PrimitiveValue = NumericValue ∪ ReturnAddressValue
NumericValue = ByteValue ∪ ShortValue ∪ IntegerValue
ReferenceValue = Location ∪ {null} ReturnAddressValue = Address
ReturnAddressValue values are elements of the Address domain (instruction addresses)
and are included for the execution of subroutine instructions (Section 6.3.4). Storage is
managed by the JCVM in terms of an abstract storage unit called word. A word is large
enough to hold reference and numeric values, with the exception of values of type int.
Two words are large enough to hold a value of type int. The function nbWords returns the
number of words of a value or a sequence of values.
The Java types byte and short—and in some implementations, the int type—are sup-
ported by the JCVM. Values of the Java type boolean are implemented as byte values,
where 1 represents true and 0 false.
Operations between numeric values are performed using the applyUnary and applyBinary
functions:
applyUnary : UnaryNumOp × Value × OpType × OpType → Value
applyBinary : BinaryNumOp × Value × Value × OpType → Value
The applyUnary function requires as arguments the operand and result types. The result
type is needed by the type conversion operator to. Binary operations do not perform type
conversions and, therefore, operand and result types are the same.
Boolean and byte values have to be sign-extended before they are pushed to the op-
erand stack. Similarly, short values placed on the stack have to be truncated before they
are stored into a field or array element of type boolean or byte. Value conversions from
byte to short, and from short to byte are performed by the toShort and toByte functions,
respectively. We write ct to denote the runtime representation of numeric constant c in
type t .
Fig. 4 lists the typing rules for Carmel. The subtype relation τ  τ ′ is defined follow-
ing the “can be assigned to” criteria as indicated by the description of checkcast and
instanceof in [28]. We only show the runtime typing rules that correspond to runtime
locations and reference types. The judgement H  loc : τ assigns the Java reference type
τ to the location loc. The judgement H  loc : τ is used to indicate that location loc can
be assigned to an element (a field or variable) of Java type τ i.e. if the runtime type of loc
is a subtype of τ or if loc is null.
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Fig. 4. Typing rules.
3.3. The JCRE domain
The JCRE domain (J ∈ JCRE) models the data maintained and actions performed by
the JCRE. This paper only deals with two aspects of the JCRE: the management of pre-
allocated exception objects (J.getException, Section 4.1) and current applet information
(J.appletContext, Section 5). A complete description of the JCRE domain is presented as
part of the semantics of the Java Card system [25].
3.4. Frames
A frame contains information about the state of execution of a method. It is defined as
follows:
F ∈ Frame = Owner × Method × Address × LocalVar × OperandStack
StackValue = Value − ByteValue
S = v1 . . .vn ∈ OperandStack = StackValue∗
V ∈ LocalVar = [StackValue⊥]
A frame F = 〈own, m, pc, V , S〉 contains the following components:
• The owning context and applet, own.context and own.aid, respectively. The owner of a
frame is either an applet or the JCRE.
• The current method structure m ∈ Method.
• The program counter register pc ∈ Address, which contains the address of the instruc-
tion currently being executed in method m.
• The array of local variables3 V .
• The operand stack S.
3 Note that this is not an array object but an array element, as defined in Section 1.1.
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JCVM instructions take their dynamic operands from the operand stack and, in some
cases, the array of local variables. The operand stack is defined as a sequence of values
S = v1 . . .vn where values on top of the stack appear on the right-hand side of the
sequence i.e. vn is on top of the stack above. The empty stack is represented with the
symbol . An element is pushed on top of the stack with the :: operator (Sv) and two
stacks are concatenated with the : operator (S : S′). For clarity we will write v1v2 instead
of v1v2.
The operand stack stores values of all types except those of type byte (and boolean).
As it was mentioned in Section 3.2, some operations may require values to be truncated
(or sign-extended) after they are popped from (or before they are pushed to) the stack. For
such cases, the fromStack(v, τ ) and toStack(v, τ ) functions are used to determine if—by
inspecting the type τ—type conversion is required and, if so, call the appropriate type
conversion function i.e. toShort and toByte.
Stack operations do not carry type information, they only require that the integrity of
the values is maintained i.e. multiword values must not be split apart.
A local variable is not referenced by name but by the position it occupies in the array of
local variables. Uninitialised local variables are denoted by ⊥. The array of local variables
can store values of any of the stack types. Local variable slots are not statically typed
so values of different types can be stored in the same slot at different times during the
execution of a method. Special care must be taken when using multiword values. An int
value stored in V [i] takes two slots and access to V [i + 1] is prohibited. We model this by
making V [i + 1] = ⊥ if position i holds an int value.
We write V = v0 . . .vn when local variable array V is initialised with the sequence
of values (usually from the operand stack) v0 . . .vn. Note that V [0] = v0 but vi does
not necessarily correspond to V [i] due to multi-word values.
3.5. Configurations
A runtime configuration describes the state of execution of the JCVM. We define three
kinds of configurations:
C ∈ Config = RConfig ∪ EConfig ∪ HConfig
〈(J,K,H), SF〉 ∈ RConfig = JCRE × StaticMem × Heap × Frame∗
〈(J,K,H),E(loc)〉 ∈ EConfig = JCRE × StaticMem × Heap × Location
〈(J,K,H), halt(v)〉 ∈ HConfig = JCRE × StaticMem × Heap × Value⊥
A running configuration (RConfig) keeps track of the chain of invoked methods by using
a stack of call frames. A running configuration 〈(J,K,H), SF〉 contains the following
components:
• The JCRE component J ∈ JCRE used to model the interaction between the JCVM and
the JCRE via the API.
• The heap H, a mapping from locations to runtime objects (class and array instances).
• Static fields memory K , a mapping FieldID → Value.
• The call stack SF, where SF ∈ Frame∗.
A new frame is pushed on top of the stack when the JCVM executes an invoke instruc-
tion (Section 6.3.3). A context switch occurs if the owning context of the new frame is
different from the preceding frame. The frame of the method currently being executed—
the current frame—sits on top of the call stack. Given SF = SF′ :: 〈own, m, pc, V , S〉, the
current instruction I can be extracted with I = m.instructionAt(pc). The next instruction
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can be found at address pc + 1. The currently active context is the owning context of the
current frame.
Exception (EConfig) and halt (HConfig) configurations represent terminal states of the
JCVM. An (uncaught) exception configuration 〈(J,K,H), E(loc)〉 describes the state of
the JCVM after it was unable to find a suitable exception handler for the exception object
referenced by loc thrown during the execution of a running configuration. A halt configu-
ration 〈(J,K,H), halt(v)〉 is reached after the first invoked method—the one represented
by the frame at the bottom of the stack frame—successfully returns with value v. If the
initial method has return type void then we shall write 〈(J,K,H), halt()〉.
4. Exceptions
An exception (object) is thrown whenever a program violates the semantic constraints of
the JCVM or any other constraint specified by the programmer. All exceptions are instances
of extensions of the Throwable class and can be thrown explicitly by the programmer using
the throw instruction.
An exception is said to be caught if an appropriate exception handler is found in the cur-
rent stack of call frames. If an exception is caught, control is transferred to the start address
indicated by the exception handler and execution is resumed at that point. An uncaught
exception will cause the virtual machine to halt by generating an exception configuration.
The catchException function, defined below, takes a configuration and a reference to an
exception object, and returns the configuration where execution shall resume. Let loc be a
reference to an exception object:
catchException : RConfig × Location → RConfig ∪ EConfig
catchException(〈(J,K,H), SF〉, loc) ={〈(J,K,H), r〉 if r ∈ Frame
〈(J,K,H), E(r)〉 if r ∈ Location
where r = catchException∗(SF, H, loc)
catchException∗ : Frame∗ × Heap × Location → Frame∗ ∪ Location
catchException∗(,H, loc) = loc
catchException∗(SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S〉, H, loc) ={
catchException∗(SF, H, loc) if pc′ = ⊥
SF :: 〈own, m, pc′, V , loc〉 if pc′ /= ⊥
where H  loc : τ ∧ pc′ = findHandler(m, pc, H, loc)
The catchException∗ function searches the stack of call frames until the first appropriate
exception handler is found [29, Chapter 7]. The findHandler(m, pc, τ ) function searches
for the first exception handler in method m that can handle an exception of class τ at
address pc. Information about exception handlers is kept by the m.Handlers structure. The
detailed semantics of findHandler is described in [26].
4.1. Runtime exceptions
Runtime exceptions (RTException) may be raised by the JCVM during the execution
of a program. Being memory usage an important concern, the creation of unique runtime
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exception objects per class is enforced. These are JCRE owned, unique, pre-allocated ex-
ceptions objects designated as temporary JCRE entry points. The JCRE keeps a reference
to each instance of the Java RuntimeException objects. These references can be accessed
using the getException function. The getException function has the following property:
getException ∈ JCRE → RTException → Location
∀cl ∈ RTException, ∃loc ∈ Location :
(loc = J.getException(cl)) ∧ (o = H(loc)) ∧ (o.class = cl)
(o.owner = JCRE) ∧ (o.entryPoint = temp)
5. The JCVM firewall
The Java Card platform partitions the object system into separate protected object spaces
called contexts. A Context is either a package AID or the special JCRE context associated
to actions performed by the JCRE. An object is owned4 by the applet that was active
(currently active owner) when the object was created (see new instruction, Section 6.3.2)
or by the JCRE. An applet’s owning context is determined by the AID of the package
where the applet is declared. An object’s owning context is the same as the owning context
of its owner, which in general means that the owning context of an object is the package
where the object’s class is declared. The JCVM firewall provides a security mechanism
that prevents an object from being accessed by code running in a different context i.e. by
an object with a different owning context, thus providing a coarse type of applet isolation.
Object and field accesses among different instances of the same applet or instances of
applets declared in the same package (group context) is allowed since they share the same
context.
Prior to performing an access operation on an object, the JCVM performs a runtime
check that depends on the instruction, the currently active context (ctxt), and the type and
owner of the referenced object (o) [28, Chapter 6]. Additionally, store operations check
the value that is being stored e.g. canStore(H, v). The firewall runtime checks are defined
in Fig. 5. The JCVM will throw an instance of the class SecurityException whenever
a firewall violation has been detected. In general, access to an object is disallowed if the
current context—the context of the current frame—is different from the owning context of
the object that is being accessed (Eq. (5)). In addition the JCRE maintains its own context.
This context has special system privileges and can access any object (Eq. (4)). Thus, in
the simplest case, access of object o from context ctxt is allowed if any of the following
conditions are met:
isJCRE(ctxt) ≡ (ctxt = JCRE) (4)
sameContext(ctxt, o) ≡ (ctxt = o.owner.context) (5)
This is the case of the checkGetField predicate: an instance field of an object (o) can only
be accessed if the currently active context (ctxt) is either the JCRE or the owning applet
of the object. These conditions alone would make the firewall system too restrictive. The
JCRE provides several mechanisms to allow object access across contexts: global arrays,
JCRE entry points and shareable interfaces. JCRE entry point objects—temporary and
4 An applet is owned by itself.
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Fig. 5. JCVM firewall checks.
permanent—and global arrays are objects owned by the JCRE that can be accessed from
any context. We say that an object o has global access if the conditions defined in Eq.
(6) are true. Objects with global access have a special restriction. References to objects
designated as temporary JCRE entry points and global arrays cannot be stored in class
fields, instance fields or array components, as defined by the canStore predicate in (7).
globalAccess(o) ≡ (o ∈ ClassInst ∧ o.entryPoint /= no) ∨
(o ∈ ArrayObject ∧ o.global) (6)
canStore(H, v) ≡ (v ∈ ReferenceValue) ⇒ canStoreObject(H(v)) (7)
canStoreObject(o) ≡ (o ∈ ArrayObject ∧ ¬o.global) ∨
(o ∈ ClassInst ∧ o.entryPoint /= temp)
The objectAccess predicate (Eq. (8)) spells out the general conditions under which access
to object o is allowed. The predicate includes an additional check for CLEAR_ON_DESELECT
transient objects (transAccess, Eq. (9)). Transient objects of CLEAR_ON_DESELECT type can
only be accessed when the currently active context (ctxt) is the context of the currently
selected applet (app)5. We have
objectAccess(ctxt, app, o) ≡ isJCRE(ctxt) ∨(
transAccess(ctxt, app, o) ∧
(
sameContext(ctxt, o)
∨globalAccess(o)
))
(8)
transAccess(ctxt, app, o) ≡ (o ∈ ArrayObject) ⇒
((o.transient = CLEAR_ON_DESELECT) ⇒ (ctxt = app)) (9)
5 The currently selected applet can be obtained from the JCRE element by calling the appletContext function.
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Currently, only arrays with primitive type components and arrays with references to Ob-
ject can be transient objects. It may seem an abuse of notation to include transAccess as
part of the firewall checks of instructions that do not deal with arrays but, by doing so,
we provide a general criterion for most firewall checks. Later versions of the Java Card
platform may allow transient class instances. In the worst case, the transAccess condition
is trivially true. Still, we would like to point out that it is possible to invoke methods of the
Object class on an array.
Another mechanism that allows object access across contexts is the use of shareable
interfaces. A shareable interface is an interface that extends the javacard.framework.
Shareable interface. Methods of shareable interfaces can be invoked from one context
even if the object implementing them is owned by an applet in another context. An interface
method declared in iface can be invoked on object o iff:
isShareable(o, iface) ≡
{
Shareable ∈ implements∗(o.class)∧
Shareable ∈ superInterfaces∗(iface)
that is, if the object’s class implements a Shareable interface i.e. o is a Shareable Interface
Object, and if the interface in question extends the Shareable interface. The same condi-
tions are used when the checkcast or instanceof instructions are applied to an interface
type.
6. The operational semantics of carmel
6.1. The evaluation relation
The operational semantics of Carmel is defined as a relation ⇒ between program con-
figurations. We say that the judgement C ⇒ C′ is true if configuration C′ is the result of
executing the current instruction (Section 3.5) in configuration C.
We give the evaluation rules of Carmel in Section 6.3. The evaluation rules detail the set
of conditions under which the assertion C ⇒ C′ is true. The first condition in all the rules
determines the instruction that is being executed: the current instruction. For example, in
the rule for the nop instruction:
I = m.instructionAt(pc) ∧ I = nop ∧ G = (J,K, F )
〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V , S〉〉 ⇒ 〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc + 1, V , S〉〉
the current instruction is obtained with m.instructionAt(pc), where m and pc are the method
and program counter kept by the current frame. The nop does not modify the state of the pro-
gram except for the program counter. The program counter is incremented to point to the
next instruction (pc + 1) where execution should resume. Since the process of reading the
instruction is the same for all rules, from now on we will consider I = m.instructionAt(pc)
as the default and write I = instruction. We will also assumeG = (J,K, F )unless stated
otherwise.
The semantics presented in this section correspond to the semantics of the offensive
virtual machine defined in [29]. Therefore, we only show the conditions and changes to the
program state that result when the current execution succeeds. Successful execution of the
instructions is ensured by the static conditions checked by the bytecode verified. Runtime
violations of the semantics of the language—that cannot be detected by the verifier—are
reported by the JCVM by throwing an exception. The process of throwing an exception is
explained in the next section.
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6.2. Throwing exceptions
The JCVM performs a series of runtime checks that preserve the semantic constraints
of the language. These runtime checks appear in the evaluation rules as predicates prefixed
with the word check. We have already defined the predicates that enforce the firewall condi-
tions in Section 5. The violation of a firewall predicate will result in a SecurityException.
The rest of the predicates that determine the conditions for throwing a runtime exception
are:
checkNotNull(loc) ≡ (loc /= null)
checkArithmetic(op, v1, v2) ≡ op ∈ {div, rem} ∨ v2 /= 0
checkNotNegative(n) ≡ (n  0)
checkCanCast(H, loc, τ ) ≡ H  loc : τ
checkArrayBounds(a, i) ≡ (0  i < a.length)
(10)
We associate the runtime checks defined above to the null pointer, arithmetic, negative size
array, class cast and array index out of bounds exceptions,6 respectively. The violation of
any of these runtime checks will trigger the JCVM to throw the runtime exception associ-
ated with them. For example, if the checkNotNull(loc) condition is not true in a particular
rule then the null pointer exception is thrown by the JCVM. If more than one runtime check
is violated, then the exception associated to the runtime check that appears first in the rule
will be thrown.
Every instruction that can potentially throw an exception has a separate rule that de-
scribes the detailed conditions of such event. Due to lack of space we have not included all
the exception rules but show an example instead. Let us have a look at the rule for getfield
of Fig. 7. The corresponding rule that describes the process of throwing a runtime exception
is shown below. Once the runtime violation is found, the JCVM throws the JCRE-owned
exception object by first calling the getException function. If an exception handler is found,
execution is resumed from the frame returned by catchException. Otherwise, an exception
configuration is created.
I = getfield f ∧ S = S′ :: loc ∧
e =
{
NullPointerException if ¬checkNotNull(loc)
SecurityException if ¬checkGetField(own.context, H(loc))∧
loc′ = getException(J, e)∧
r = catchException(〈(J,K,H), SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S〉〉, loc′)
〈(J,K,H), SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S〉〉 ⇒ C′
6.3. Evaluation rules
6.3.1. The core language
The core language supports instructions for stack manipulation, local variable access,
numerical operation and branching. Stack instructions deal explicitly with the operand
stack. They do not carry type information—with the sole exception of push that uses the
operand type to put the right kind of value on top of the stack—and operate ignoring the
type of data on the stack. Instead, stack instructions operate at the word level and their
6 NullPointer, ArithmeticException, NegativeArraySizeException, ClassCastException and Ar-
rayIndexOutOfBoundsException.
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operands indicate the number of words to be manipulated. For example, the execution of
the pop n instruction results on the top n words being popped from the operand stack. A
more elaborate rule is shown below:
I = dup n d ∧ S = S3 : S2 : S1∧
n = nbWords(S1) ∧ d = nbWords(S2 : S1) ∧ S′ = S3 : S1 : S2 : S1
〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V , S〉〉 ⇒ 〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc + 1, V , S′〉〉
Execution of the dup instruction results on a new configuration where the top n words on
the operand stack have been duplicated and inserted d words down from the top. When
d equals 0, the top n words are copied and placed on top of the stack. The rules respect
the restriction that preserve the integrity of two-word values by making sure that only
whole values are moved. This is also true for the instructions that manipulate the array
of local variables V where, as we pointed out in Section 3.4, the special symbol ⊥ is
used to “block” the index that corresponds to the second word of an int value. The load
instruction places the value of local variable i on top of the stack and store updates local
variable i with the value found on top of the stack. The success of the rules is ensured by
the bytecode verification process which we assume has taken place.
The numop instruction uses the top two elements of the stack—after removing them—as
arguments to the numeric operation op and places the result back on the stack. The goto
instruction jumps to the instruction found in address addr. The if instruction—shown be-
low—jumps to addr only if the result of performing the comparison operation cmp between
the top two elements of the stack is true, otherwise it continues to the next instruction.
I = if t cmp goto addr ∧
pc′ =
{
addr if applyComparison(cmp, v1, v2)
pc + 1 otherwise
〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S ::v1 ::v2〉〉 ⇒ 〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc′, V , S〉〉
The rest of the evaluation rules for the instructions of the core language are shown in
Fig. 6. We have not included the evaluation rules of the if and op instructions that han-
dle null comparisons and unary operations. We have also excluded the keyswitch and
indexswitch instructions. The complete formalisation of these instructions can be found
in [26].
6.3.2. The object language
The instructions described in this section deal with the creation and manipulation of
class instances. The evaluation rules for the instructions of the object language are shown
in Fig. 7. The new cl instruction creates a new instance object of class cl by calling the
newObject relation defined in (1). The owner of the current frame is designated as the
owner of the new object. The getstatic and putstatic instructions use the field ID f .id
to access the static field f in K . The rest of the instructions take the location of the object
to be read, modified or inspected from the stack. For example, in the case of the putfield
instruction shown below:
I = putfield f ∧ v′ = fromStack(v, f.type) ∧ o = H(loc)∧
checkNotNull(loc) ∧ checkPutField(own.context, o,H, v)∧
H ′ = updateEle(H, (loc, f.id), v′)
〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S′ :: loc ::v〉〉 ⇒ 〈G′, SF :: 〈own, m, pc + 1, V , S′〉〉
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Fig. 6. The core language semantics.
the location of the object to be modified and the new value of field f are taken from
the operand stack. A type conversion is performed, if needed, by the fromStack func-
tion (Section 3.4). The new value is stored in field f of the resolved object o using
the updateEle function (Eq. (3)). The putfield this and getfield this instructions
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Fig. 7. The object language semantics.
(not included here) take the location of the object from V [0], the location of the current
object.
The semantics of checkcast and instanceof are given by the definition of H  loc :
τr (Fig. 4). The difference between checkcast and instanceof is that the former throws
a ClassCastException when the operation is not valid (checkCanCast predicate, Eq. 10).
Firewall security checks take as arguments the current context, the current applet context,
the object being accessed and, in the case of putstatic and putfield, the value being
stored.
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6.3.3. Method language
The evaluation rules for the instructions of the method language are shown in Fig. 8.
The invokedefinite instruction is used for static methods and for non-static methods that
have been resolved statically. The invokedefinite instruction contains a resolved method
as argument. No method search through the class hierarchy is needed, even if the original
call was made to an inherited method. The method has been resolved statically i.e. before
execution when loaded and linked.
Fig. 8. The method language semantics.
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The invokevirtual and invokeinterface instructions perform a method lookup based
on the class of the object where the method is being invoked (target object). This search is
performed by the lookupID function. All methods sharing the same signature are assigned
the same method ID. Thus, if a method overrides another one or if an instance method
implements an interface method, their method IDs are equal. Given a method ID and a
class cl, the function lookupID(id, cl) returns the first method structure with the same
method ID found in the superclass hierarchy of class cl.
An array may be the target of an invokevirtual instruction. If that’s the case then
the search must be performed on the Object class structure. This check is performed by
the methodLookup function which, given a method m and an object o, returns the correct
method. The definitions of lookupID and methodLookup are listed below:
lookupID : MethodID × Class⊥ → Method⊥
lookupID(id,⊥) =⊥
lookupID(id, cl) =
{
m if ∃m ∈ cl.methods. m.id = ID
lookupID(id, cl.superclass) otherwise
methodLookup : Method × Object → Method⊥
methodLookup(m, o) =
{
lookupID(m′.id, Object) o ∈ ArrayObject
lookupID(m′.id, o.class) otherwise
We describe the execution of the invokevirtual instruction (see rule below). The top
n + 1 values—corresponding to the n method arguments and object location (this)—are
popped from the operand stack of the current frame and placed in the local variables array
of the new frame F ′. The owner of the target object o is set as owner of the new frame.
The new operand stack is set to empty and, if both runtime checks succeed, the new frame
is pushed onto the call frame stack. The current method is now mv and execution will
continue at the first instruction of the method (pc = 0). A context switch occurs when a
method of an object owned by a different context is invoked i.e. two consecutive frames
have different contexts.
I = invokevirtual m′ ∧ n = |m′|∧
F = 〈own, m, pc, V, S :: loc ::v1 :: . . . ::vn〉∧
checkNotNull(loc) ∧ o = H(loc) ∧ mv = methodLookup(m′, o)∧
checkInvokeVirtual(own.context, J.appletContext, o)∧
V ′ = loc ::v1 :: . . . ::vn ∧ F ′ = 〈o.owner, mv, 0, V ′, 〉
〈G, SF ::F 〉 ⇒ 〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S〉 ::F ′〉
Method return is handled by the return instruction. We have identified four cases. The
first case,
I = return t ∧
F = 〈own, m, pc, V, S ::v〉 ∧ F ′ = 〈own′, m′, pc′, V ′, S′〉
〈G, SF ::F ′ ::F 〉 ⇒ 〈G, SF :: 〈own′, m′, pc′ + 1, V ′, S′ ::v〉〉
corresponds to the return from a method with return type different from void. The value
v is popped from the operand stack of the current frame and pushed onto the operand
stack of the frame of the invoker. The virtual machine then removes the current frame
and returns control to the invoker. If the current frame is the last remaining frame in the
configuration then the JCVM copies the return value v to the special halt configuration and
stops execution, as shown by the return t rule in Fig. 8. The last two cases—shown in
Fig. 8—correspond to void returns.
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6.3.4. The array, exception and subroutine language
The evaluation rules of the instructions that deal with the creation and manipulation of
arrays, the explicit throwing of exceptions by the programmer and the call of (and return
from) subroutines, are listed in Fig. 9. A new array is created by the new τ instruction
when the parameter τ denotes an array type. New arrays are initialised as non-global,
non-transient objects by the newArray relation (Eq. 2). The owner of the current frame is
set as the owner of the new array. The location of the new array is placed on top of the
operand stack of the current frame. The other array instructions take their arguments—
Fig. 9. The array, exception and subroutine language semantics.
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array location and index—from the operand stack. Transfer of data from the operand stack
to an array object, and vice versa, is performed using the fromStack and toStack functions,
respectively, as shown by the rule for arrayload below:
I = arrayload t ∧ checkNotNull(loc) ∧ a = H(loc)∧
checkArrayBounds(a, i) ∧ v = toStack(a.values[i], t)∧
checkArrayLoad(own.context, J.appletContext, a)
〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc, V, S :: loc :: i〉〉 ⇒ 〈G, SF :: 〈own, m, pc + 1, V , S ::v〉〉
The rest of the rules deal with the Exception and Subroutine language. The throw instruc-
tion is used by the programmer to throw the exception object referenced by the location
placed on top of the stack. The location loc on top of the stack must be a reference to an
object that is an instance of class Throwable or of a subclass of Throwable. The process
of catching the exception referenced by loc is performed by catchException (Section 4),
where loc has been popped from the operand stack of the top frame. The jsr instruction
jumps to the subroutine address indicated by its operand and places the address of the next
instruction on top of the stack. The ret instruction jumps to the address stored in local
variable i.
7. Related work
Since its official release, the Java language has attracted considerable interest from the
research community. Hartel and Moreau [15] provide a comprehensive review of the sub-
stantial amount of work dedicated to the study of each of the main components of Java: the
Java Language, the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and Java to JVM compiler; and most of its
interesting features: object-orientation, dynamic class loading, garbage collection, multi-
threading, its type system and bytecode verification. However, as pointed out in [15], no
single attempt has been made at specifying full Java, the full JVM, or the full compiler.
Most research of the semantics of Java Card has been produced by—or is related to—the
formal methods and program verification community. Formal specifications of the seman-
tics of Java Card can be traced back to [14] (virtual machine) and [2] (source code). Hartel
et al. [14] provide a complete specification of the Java Secure Processor (JSP), a precursor
of the JCVM. JSP is a virtual machine designed to fit on a smart card and, as such, does
not support multi-threading, garbage collection and exception handling. The specifications
are defined and validated using the LETOS tool [13]. Attali et al. [3] adapt their work with
Java and the Centuar tool to Java Card and provide a programming environment for Java
Card applications [2]. The research group at Gemplus has produced some work related
to the application of the B-method [1] to the formalisation of the semantics of Java Card
[7,17,24].
CertiCartes [4,5] constitutes one of the most in-depth machine-checked accounts of the
Java Card platform up to date. It contains formal executable specifications written in Coq
[9] of a defensive JCVM, an offensive JCVM and an abstract JCVM together with the
specification of a Java Card Bytecode Verifier (BCV) presented as a data-flow analyser
based on the abstract virtual machine.
The LOOP project [19] project is involved in the application of formal methods to object
oriented languages. The aim is to specify and verify properties of classes in object-oriented
languages, using proof tools like PVS [23] and Isabelle/HOL [22]. Its main contribution
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to the formalisation of the semantics of Java Card has been the formal specification of the
Java Card API in JML and ESC/Java [16,21].
8. Conclusions and future work
The work presented in this paper has been developed in the context of the Secsafe
project. The Secsafe project is concerned with the application of static analysis technology
to the validation of security and safety aspects of realistic languages and applications. The
project has focused a substantial part of its efforts on the development of methods that can
be applied to the domain of smart cards and, in particular, Java Card and its applications
(applets). In this context, a formalisation of the semantics of Java Card provides the frame-
work where we can specify security properties, derive control and data flow analyses [12]
that safely approximate such properties, and prove the analyses correct. Further refinements
to the semantics will be directed—among other things—towards this goal.
Our first step have been to formalise the JCVM by defining the semantics of Carmel,
a complete representation of the JCVML. The results of this work are presented in this
paper. A more in-depth account of this specification can be found at our technical report
[26].
We have seen that the specification presented in this paper relies on elements of the
JCRE. Other important features of the JC platform are implemented by the API. In order
for this specification to be useful, we need to placed it in context with the runtime environ-
ment and formalise its interaction with the off-card applications. The next step has been to
provide a formal specification of the JCRE and the API. This is work in progress and can
be found in [25].
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